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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MANUFACTURER'S

ADVERTISmEiT

AS

EXPRESS

WARRANTY

TO

CoNsumER. One of the important developments in econonc life in

recent years has been the greatly increased production of packaged
and labeled goods, advertised and distributed nationally by the
manufacturer. The scope of the retailer's function has been correspondingly reduced, especially in regard to inspection. Naturally
there has resulted a tendency in the law to increase the responsibility of the manufacturer to the consumer.
The Washington court in a recent case, Baxter v. Ford Motor
Co.,' has taken a decided step in this direction. Plaintiff alleged
that in reliance on representations made by defendant manufacturer that Ford cars were equipped with non-shatterable windshields he purchased a Ford car from a regular retail dealer, that
while driving this car some months later the windshield was struck
by a flying pebble, causing it to shatter, and that a piece of glass
entered his eye, resulting in the loss thereof, for which injury
damages are sought. The trial court refused to admit in evidence
certain catalogues and circulars fuirmshed by defendant to the
retail dealer for sales assistance which had been shown to plaintiff
prior to the sale, took the case from the jury, and entered judgment
168

Dec. 2.

Wash. Dec. 384, 12 P. (2d) 409. Affirmed on rehearing, 70 Wash.
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for the defendant.2 One such catalogue, which plaintiff testified
he relied upon, contained the following statements
"All of the new Ford cars have a Triplex shatter-proof
glass windshield-so made that it will not fly or shatter
under the hardest impact. This is an important safety
factor because it eliminates the dangers of flying glassthe cause of most of the injuries in automobile accidents.
In these days of crowded, heavy traffic, the use of this
Triplex glass is an absolute necessity Its extra margin
of safety is something that every motorist should look for
in the purchase of a car-especially where there are
women and children."'
Upon appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and
ordered a new trial, holding that the catalogues were improperly
excluded, and that it was for the jury to determine whether the
failure of defendant to equip the car with non-shatterable glass
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury The court recognized that this decision was contrary to precedents and based it
squarely upon public policy in the light of changing economic conditions. Speaking through Mr. Justice Herman, it said
"Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated,
vast changes have taken place in the economic structures of
the English speaking peoples. Methods of doing business
have undergone a great transition. Radio, billboards
and the products of the printing press have become the
means of creating a large part of the demand that causes
goods to depart from factories to the ultimate consumer.
It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would pernut
manufacturers of goods to create a demand for their
products by representing that they possess qualities which
they, in fact, do not possess, and then, because there is
no privity of contract existing between the consumer
and the manufacturer, deny the consumer the right to
recover if damages result from the absence of those qualities, when such absence is not readily noticeable.
" 'An exception to a rule will be declared by courts
when the case is not an isolated instance, but general in its
character and the existing rule does not square with justice. Under such circumstances, a court will, if free from
the restraint of some statute, declare a rule that will meet
the full intendment of the law ' Mazetts v. Armour & Co.,
75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633."
The rule to be deduced from the case seems to be, that those
statements of fact concerning his product contained m a manu2This is a simplified statement of the case designed to set forth only
such facts as are necessary to present the problem under discussion. In
the actual case, plaintiff joined the retail dealer, who relied on an express
disclaimer in the bill of sale. A limited express warranty by the manufacturer was printed on the back of this bill of sale.
3Note that these statements preclude defendant from setting up that
plaintiff's injury was not foreseeable or not within the contemplation of
the parties.
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facturer's advertisements are express warranties as to a consumer
who in justifiable reliance thereon purchases the product in the
regular course of trade. How far and in what manner this rule
will vary or extend the recognized obligations of the manufacturer
to the consumer may be indicated in part by a brief comparison of
the facts here with the essentials of the various forms of action
and categories of liability. This, too, may serve to test the validity of the deduction, that is, determine whether or not the rule
as stated is a necessary inference from the holding under the particular facts.
The defendant's possible liability is not based upon any negligence in the manufacture or inspection of the windshield. This
is apparent from the language of the opinion. In any event, the
general rule that a manufacturer is liable to only his immediate
vendee for defects in his product 4 would apply, since the defect
here is not of the type which would render the automobile a "thing
of danger" within the exception to the rule announced in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' That which was standard equipment in
1927 could hardly be deemed imminently dangerous in 1930.
Nor is this a case of fraud or deceit under the recognized limitations of those actions.6 The great majority of courts require
scienter or recklessness on the part of the defendant.'
As the
Washington court has phrased it, "it must appear that the maker
[of the representations] knew them to be false or made them recklessly as facts without knowledge of their truth.", This is probably
the rule in this state in situations where no privity of contract
exists despite general statements in more recent cases that scienter
is immaterial.6 In view of the many tests successfully conducted
4Kramer
v. Carbolineum Wood Preserving Co., 105 Wash. 401, 177 Pac.
771 (1919); Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865, 57 C. C.
A. 237, 61 L. R. A. 303 (1903); 45 C. J., p. 887 et seq. The cases are collected in 17 A. L. R. 672; 39 id. 992; 63 id. 340. See also 40 Harv. L. Rev.
886 (1927), and 10 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1925).
5217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 440, L. R. A. 1916F,
696 (1916). Cardozo, J.: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is
then a thing of danger." (111 N. E. 1053), and the manufacturer is liable
to the consumer for defects. For the older rules see Huset v. J. I. Case
Threshing Mach. Co., supra note 4, and Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145
Ky. 616, 140 S. W. 1047, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 689, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 560
(1911). 45 C. J. p. 691.
'Manufacturers' advertisements may be the basis of an action in
deceit. Thus in Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co., 73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac. 241
(1913), the court was prepared to hold defendant liable in deceit for
falsely advertising that his brand of explosive was safe to handle, but
preferred to base the liability on negligence. The cases of Newhall v.
Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 437, 134 N. E. 625 (1922), and Alpine v.
Friend Bros., Inc., 244 Mass. 164, 138 N. E. 553 (1923), illustrate the
difficulty of recovery in this type of case.
'26 C. J. p. 1105 et seq.
IHamilton v. Mihills, 92 Wash. 675 at 679, 159 Pac. 887 (1916) ; Raser v.
Moomaw, 78 Wash. 653, 139 Pac. 622, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 707 (1914).
'"We have held the rule to be that if a person states as true material
facts susceptible of knowledge to one who relies and acts thereon to his
injury, he cannot defeat recovery by showing that he did not know his
representations were false, or that he believed them to be true." Jacquot
v. Farmers Straw Gas Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482, 249 Pac. 984 (1926),
an action by the buyer against the seller of machinery. The court cites as
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on these windshields it cannot be said that the statements in the
catalogue were made recklessly, much less fraudulently
Neither is the liability based upon general contract principles.
Conceivably this result might be reached by construing the publication of the catalogue containing such statements as a continuing
offer to all members of the public to enter unilateral contracts by
performing the act of purchasing a Ford car from a regular dealer,
whereupon defendant would become bound to hold such purchasers
harmless from any injury resulting from the failure of such car
to conform to said statements. Offers to the general public have
been made the basis of contracts in the prize contest cases"0 and a
few other situations.1 However, it would be highly artificial to
find a contract here where neither party actually intended to enter
one.
The recognized right of action to which this case most nearly
approaches is that of breach of express warranty Although the
Uniform Sales Act 1 2 does not in terms cover this situation since it
governs only the relations between "seller" and "buyer",13 it
represents the law of mercantile warranty as now existing and
will no doubt greatly influence any future developments in this
field. Section 12 of the Act (Rem. 1927 Supp. See. 5836-12,
Pierce's Code, See. 6227-12) defines express warranties
"Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller
relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural
tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the
buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases
the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of
the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion shall be construed as a warranty "
It will be observed that the intent of the seller to warrant is
authority for the above statement the following cases, all of which involved
the parties to a sale of land or chattels: Hanson v. Tompkins, 2 Wash.
508, 27 Pac. 73 (1891) Sears v. Stinson, 3 Wash. 615, 29 Pac. 205 (1892)
Grant v. Huschke, 74
West v. Carter 54 Wash. 236, 103 Pac. 21 (1909)
Wash. 257, 133 Pac. 447 (1913) May v. Roberts, 126 Wash. 645, 219 Pac.
55 (1923)
Pratt v. Thompson, 133 Wash. 218, 233 Pac. 637 (1926). CI.
Aldrich v. Scribner 154 Mich. 23, 117 N. W 581 (1908) See WILLISTON,
24 Harv L. Rev. 415,
Inability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911)
435-7, for an argument in favor of extending the scope of the action of
deceit.

1 Carlillv. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893), 1 Q. B. 256, Minton v. F G.

Smith Piano Co., 36 App. D. C. 137, 33 L. R. A. (N.S.) 305 (1911) Weisz
v. Price, 186 Iowa 640, 172 N. W 939 (1919) Mooney v. Daily News Co.,
116 Minn. 212, 133 N. W 573, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 183 (1911) Holt v. Rural
Weekly Co., 173 Minn. 337, 217 N. W 345 (1928)
"In Tarbell v. A. J. Stevens & Co., 7 Iowa 163 (1858), it was held that
a banker who had advertised that he was a stockholder in a certain bank
and was personally liable on its notes was under a primary contractual
obligation to one who had taken the notes in reliance thereon. The decision is placed on the ground of public policy Cf. Westervelt v. Demarest,
46 N. J. L. 37, 50 Am. Rep. 400 (1884)
"Laws of 1925, Ex. Ses., Chap. 142; Rem. 1927 Supp. §§ 5836-1 ff.,
Pierce's Code §§ 6227-1 ff.
11Sec. 76 of the act defines these terms.
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not material.1" The obligation is imposed upon him by law, and in
this respect is similar to the tort liability for deceit.' 5 Professor
Williston describes it as "an obligation either on a quasi-contract
or a quasi-tort," and points out that it was originally a tort
action.' Although the usual remedy modernly
is an action on the
17
contract, recovery may still be had in tort.
It is well established that statements of fact contained in the
general advertisements of the seller are express warranties when
relied upon by the buyer.'8 The Washington court has recently
stated that "the affirmations contained in the catalogue constituted
express warranties when the purchaser had knowledge thereof and
acted thereon. 24 R. C. L. 164. " 19
The chief objection to treating the affirmations in the instant
case as2 0an express warranty is the lack of privity between the
parties.
"To sustain a finding that there was a breach of warranty express or implied, there must have been evidence of
a contract between the parties, for without a contract
there could be no warranty "21
It is not clear why or when this requirement of privity originated. There is a dearth of authority on the question. 22 One possible
explanation is that it is another manifestation of that policy which
""It would be immaterial whether the representations by the sellers
were intended as a warranty, if the appellants relied on them." Huntington v. Lombard, 22 Wash. 202, 60 Pac. 414 (1900, before Sales Act) Van
Horn v. Stautz, 297 Ill. 530, 131 N. E. 153 (1921) Brennan & Cohen v.
Nolan Laundry Co., 209 Iowa 922, 229 N. W 321 (1930) Cf. Spencer Heater
Co. v. Abbott, 91 N. J.L. 594, 104 Atl. 91 (1918), which sets out the English rule. 1 WILISTON, Sales (2d Ed.) see 194.
25 "For if one man lull another
into security as to the goodness of a
commodity, by giving him a warranty of it, it is the same thing whether
or not the seller knew it to be unfit for sale; the warranty is the thing
which deceives the buyer who relies on it, and is thereby put off his
guard," per Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in Williamson v. Allison, 2 East 446,
451, 102 Eng. Rep. 439 (1802) wherein the same judge stated that the
contractual remedy for breach of warranty had then been in use only
about forty years.
" 1 WILLISTON, op. cit., sec. 197. This section is cited with approval in
Glaspey v. Wool Growers Sermce Corp., 151 Wash. 683, 277 Pac. 70 (1929).
'ISlippen v. Bowem, 122 U. S. 575, 30, L. ed. 1172, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1283

(1887).

21Buchanan v. Laber, 39 Wash. 410, 81 Pac. 911 (1905), warranty in
catalogue incorporated into written contract by reference held to prevent
showing of inconsistent warranty by parol; Kuhn v. Campbell, 118 Ohio
St. 392, 161 N. E. 25 (1928), statement in catalogue of auction sale that
horse could trot at 2:15 gait held warranty that horse could trot that fast
at time of sale; Gray v. Gurney Seed & Nursery Co., ___S. D ......
231
N. W 940 (1930), statement in seed catalogue that certain type of corn
matures well in northern South Dakota held an express warranty- Baumgartner v. Glesener, 171 Minn. 289, 214 N. W 27 (1927), advertisement in
newspaper that certain seed corn had a germinating test of 95% held an
express warranty. Cases are collected in 28 A. L. R. 991.
"Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Case Shingle & Lumber Co., 152 Wash.
37, 276 Pac. 892 (1929).
'01 WLLISTON, op. cit., sec. 244.
"Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 Atl. 271 (1910).
1 WILLISTON, op. cit., see. 244, 244a.
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found its best known expression in the case of Winterbottom v.
Wright,23 that of protecting a manufacturer against liability to an
unknown and unlimited number of persons. Another possible
explanation is that because of the almost exclusive use of the contractual remedy for breach of warranty, the courts came to regard
24
a warranty as a purely contractual obligaton.
In any event,
the requirement has been
applied
consistently
and
rigorously
even
25
in rather extreme cases.
By the weight of authority, the same rule is applied in the case
of implied warranties, both of title,26 and of quality 11 There is a
strong minority of courts, however, which allow the consumer to
recover from the manufacturer on the basis of an implied warranty
running with the chattel. 28 The Washington
court adopted this
29
view in the case of Mazettt v. Armour & Co.
"Our holding is that, in the absence of an express war
ranty of quality, a manufacturer of food products under
modern conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in original packages, and that such warranty is
available to all who may be damaged by reason of their
use in the legitimate channels of trade."
"10 M. &W 109, 11 L. J. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). Defendant,
who built a coach and sold it with an agreement to keep it in repair, held
not liable to buyer's servant for personal injuries caused by defendant's
failure to repair. Under similar facts the same result was reached in
Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 255 Pac. 939, 52 A. L. R.
851 (1927).
"The present rule in England seems to be that actual intent to enter
a contract of warranty must be found. Heilbut Symons & Co. v. Buckleton,
(1913) App. Cas. 30. This case is criticized by Prof. Williston in Represensation and Warranty in Sales, (1913) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 1. Cf. Bekkevold
v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W 790, 59 A. L. R. 1164 (1927), holding
that an implied warranty of quality is not barred by a written disclaimer
of all warranties "made" by the seller, since it is imposed by law regardless of the intent of the seller.
In S. H. Kress & Co, v. Lindsey, 262 Fed. 331, 13 A. L. R. 1170(C.C.A.,
Miss., 1919) beneficiaries under a Wrongful Death Act were not allowed to
recover from the seller for breach of warranty which was the proximate
cause of buyer's death. In State to use of Bond v. Consolidated Gas, Elec.
tric Light & P Co. of Baltimore, 146 Md. 390, 126 Atl. 105, 42 A. L. R. 1237
(1924), it was held that an express warranty that a gas heater was safe
to use in living quarters did not inure to the benefit of an infant child
of the buyer.
" Peregrine v. West Seattle Bank, 120 Wash. 653, 208 Pac. 35 (1922)
refusing to extend doctrine of Mazetti case, infra note 29.
Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 785, L. R A. 1916D,
1006 (1916) wife of buyer of food, Birm2ngham Chero-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64, 17 A. L. R. 667 (1921), subvendee of beverage; Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186, 39 A. L. R. 972
(1925) subvendee of bread, Minutille v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50
R. I. 50, 144 AtI. 884, 63 A. L. R. 334 (1929), subvendee of ice cream.
"8Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa, 175, 176 N. W 382, 17
A. L. R. 649 (1920), subvendee of canned beans; Coca Cola Bottling Works
v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) donee from subvendee of beverage.
75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 140, 48 L. R. A. (N.S.)
213 (1913). This case allowed a subvendee of spoiled canned tongue who
served it in his restaurant to recover for loss of trade and good will.
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As has been pointed out in a well considered case" this minority
doctrine has been applied only in foodstuff cases, a situation in
which all courts allow the consumer to recover in an action based
on negligence regardless of lack of privity 31 Moreover, the courts
in the foodstuff cases are prone to relieve the plaintiff of the
burden of proving defendant's negligence and have adopted
various theories to achieve this end.3 2 Thus it is possible to regard
the entire minority doctrine of running waxranties as a mere procedural fiction, ana no sound basis from which to alter substantive law in other types of cases by analogy 13
On the other hand there is good reason to consider the orthodox
view of privity, limited to the immediate relation of seller and
buyer, as being too narrow. The manufacturer, when he advertises,
clearly intends to induce purchases and thereby secure a benefit,
and the consumer as clearly acts in reliance when he calls for
articles by trade name and receives them in sealed packages. The
retailer tends to become a passive intermediary, a mere conduit
like the carrier who transports the goods. Furthermore, the large
number of "warranties" to consumers appearing in advertisements, and the prevalence of the practice of replacement and
repair by the manufacturer directly, indicate that the latter very
34
often considers himself under a direct obligation to the consumer.
35
There is some inferential judicial support for this view, as well
0Pelletier v. Dupont, supra note 27.
"126 C. J. p. 785, 17 A. L. R. 688.
"Flessher v. Carstens Packsng Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 Pac. 14 (1916),
"The negligence consists in offering stuff not known to be wholesome for
sale"" Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa., 52, 95 Atl. 931, L. R. A. 1917B, 1272
(1915), "Defendant's duty was absolute. It was bound to know that the
meat was unwholesome"- Rozumailsk?. v. Philadelphwa Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 Atl. 700 (1929), "the accident proves its own negligent
cause"* Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N. W
428, 131 Am. St. Rep. 441 (1909) negligence implied from violation of state
pure food laws; Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W 497, 39
A. L. R. 1001 (1925), res %psaloquitur; Dams v. Van Camp Packzng Co.,
supra note 28, proof of defective condition despite proper handling by
retailer makes out prima facie case which defendant must rebut; Minntilla v. Providence Ice Creaim Co., supra. note 27, proof of defective condition despite proper handling is sufficient to take issue to jury with
burden of proof on plaantiff; Gearing v. Berkson., supra note 27, violation
of pure food law merely raises presumption of negligence which is rebutted
by a showing of due care, and plaintiff must give affirmative proof of
negligence.
"An example of the danger in this method of reasoning is found an
Grapico Battling Co. v. Ennss, 140 Miss. 502, 106 So. 97, 44 A. L. R. 124
(1925), where the court held that implied warranties ran to subvendees
of foodstuffs generally, but not to one who purchased a beverage in violation of Sunday blue law. Cf. a later decision of the same court, Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Ljons, supranote 28, where a donee of a subvendee was
allowed to recover on an implied warranty, and Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch,
supra note 32, where a bystander who was injured by the explosion of a
bottled beverage was allowed recovery on ground of negligence.
See BOGERT & FINK, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the
"&
Sale of Goods (1930) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400.
uIn Miller Rubber Co. v. Blewster-Stephens Service Station, 171 Ark.
1179, 287 S. W 577, 59 A. L. R. 1237 (1926) it was held that a
warranty by a manufacturer expressed in terms to the consumer did not
prevent the raising of an implied warranty to the retailer. A circular
published by a radio manufacturer and shown to a consumer by the
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as approval by commentators.16 Even those courts which uphold
the requirement of privity in its strictest form admit that the
liability should fall upon the manufacturer, indeed, they use this
argument to justify the raising of an implied warranty of quality
upon the sale of goods in sealed containers by a retailer who has had
3 7
Would it not be better to look
no opportunity to inspect them.
through the form of the transaction to the substance, and hold the
manufacturer-advertiser as the real "seller", at least to the extent
of finding sufficient privity to support an express warranty? It
does not seem such a great departure from precedent, considering
the origin and nature of the doctrine of warranty, yet it is a
step that has not been taken heretofore, and we must conclude
that the instant case announces a doctrine new to the law
The ultimate adoption or rejection of this doctrine will be determined, not by such rather legalistic attempts to squeeze it into
some established form of action, but on the sounder basis of public
policy Some of the arguments which might be advanced in its
favor are that it will tend to promote a higher ethical tone in
advertising, thus removing some of the handicap under which the
strictly honest advertiser is now laboring, that it will result in an
increased effectiveness for all advertising as soon as the public
learns that hard cash is back of every statement of fact made ;8
that it will tend to discourage careless methods of manufacture,
and that it will operate in some measure to spread the losses
caused by defective products over society as a whole, since the
manufacturer will recoup himself by raising the price of his product.39 On the other hand, the doctrine would breed litigation, both
retailer has been held not to bind the latter. Cool v. Fighter 239 Mich.
42, 214 N. W 162 (1927). An inferior Ohio court has held that the subvendee of foodstuff is a third party beneficiary of an implied warranty
arising on the sale by the manufacturer to the retailer. Ward, Baking Co.
v. Trzz o, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928)
42
'5I WILLISTON, Sales (2d Ed.) sec. 244a, 9 Corn. L. Q. 487 (1924)
Harv L. Rev. 414 (1929).
,"Rugg, C. J.. "It places responsibility upon the party to the contract best able to protect himself against wrong of this kind, and to recoup
himself in case of loss, because he knows or comes in touch with the
manufacturer." Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120
N. E. 225, 5 A. L. R. 242 (1918) Cardozo, C. J.. "Here the sale was by description, the defect was wholly latent and inspection was impossible. In
such circumstances, the law casts the burden on the seller, who may
vouch in the manufacturer, if the latter was to blame. The loss in its
final incidence will be borne where tt is placed by the initial wrong."
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105,
74 A. L. R. 339 (1931) Contra, Bsgelow v. Masne Central R. Co., 110 Me.
105, 85 Atl. 396, 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 627 (1912), refusing to hold retailer
who had no opportunity to inspect.
38Many states, including Washington (Rem. Comp. Stat. sec 2622-1)
have statutes making it a crime to issue false and misleading advertising
regardless of the good faith of the advertiser. It is pointed out in 36
Yale L. J. 1157 (1927) that these statutes were sponsored largely by the
advertising profession.
39There is nothing novel about these arguments; very similar ones
were used over a century ago in support of the then new doctrine of
implied warranties of quality Chief Justice Best in the course of his
opinion rendered in Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (1829),
said. "It is the duty of the court, in administering the law to lay down
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legitimate and spurious, and add a new and substantial hazard to
the many already confronting the manufacturer. As to the first
of these objections the danger nght be minnized by a policy of
scrutinizing a plaintiff's case with a dubious eye and requiring clear
proof of a material breach of warranty 40 As to the latter objection,
each manufacturer could protect hnself to a large extent by
inspecting carefully and advertising cautiously 41
It is submitted that the Washington court reached a desirable
result, and one that is consistent both with common law principles
and with modern business practice.
J. B. SnomiEy.
DISmmuTIoi

OF EXTRAORDINARY DIvIDENDs TUDEM A TRUST.

The distribution of extraordinary dividends between the life
tenant and the remainderman under a trust created in corporate
stock is a problem which has been extremely vexing to the courts

with the result that three general rules have been developed. But,
regardless of the rule followed, it is universally agreed that the
intentions of the testator or trustor should be controlling.' The
extraordinary dividend is most likely to arise under one of the
following circumstances
1. Where an unusually large dividend is paid out of
profits accumulated over a period of years.
2. In cases of total or part liquidation of the business
and a distribution of the funds arising from the sale of
the assets or of the business as a going concern.
Capital stock, unlike other property which may be the corpus
of the trust, is possessed of a threefold value- par, market, and book
value.! The stock is evidence of the stockholders' interest in the
corporation. Hence, par value, which is merely that printed on
the stock certificate, is clearly no evidence of the true interest
which the owner may have, since the net worth of the company
rules calculated to prevent fraud; to protebt persons who are necessarily
ignorant of the qualities of a commodity they purchase; and to make it
the interest of manufacturers and those who sell, to furnish the best
article that can be supplied." (5 Bing. 533, 543). And again: "The case is
of great importance; because it will teach manufacturers that they must
not aim at underselling each other by producing goods of inferior quality,
and that the law will protect purchasers who are necessarily ignorant of
the commodity sold." (5 Bing. 533, 546).
"1The construction placed upon the wording of the advertisement gives
the court an opportunity to exercise its discretion. See for examples of
rather strict construction the cases of Newhal v. Word Haking Co. and
Alpzne v. Frzend Bros., Inc., cited in note 6 supra.
"But there is always the danger that a chance defect will result in
liability, as in the instant case. It is somewhat ironical that the Ford
Motor Co., which has the reputation of being a very conservative advertiser, should be the defendant in this action. Yet the hazard is not as
great as this case might lead one to believe, since the measure of damages
in most cases would be but the price of the defective article.
'Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549; 34 L. ed. 525, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1057
1890) Carter v. Crehore, 12 Raw. 309 (1900) Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md.
549, 28 Atl. 565, 44 Am. St. Rep. 310 (1894) Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N.
H. 201, 66 Atl. 124, 12 L. R. A. (n. s.) 768 (1907) Irvinng v. Houstoun, 4
Paton Sc. App. 521 (1803) Bouck v. Sproule, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 385 (1887).
'KESrs, Accounting Theory and Practice (1925 Ed.), Vol. II, 398.

